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The Composite Warfare Commander is a Navy command and control construct that was designed for the former "Carrier Battle Group" in, and specifically for, the Cold War. Though the Carrier Battle Group and the Cold War are both gone, the command and control doctrine, organization, and supporting systems designed for a very specific operational environment remains intact. This paper will analyze the objectives, organization, and process of the Composite Warfare Commander, Task Force Commander, and Maritime Operations Center, and how they will interact in today's joint operational environment. It will analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the CWC architecture, specifically in terms of interoperability, flexibility, and scalability. From this analysis, it will draw conclusions on the CWC's ability to effectively apply itself across the entire spectrum of joint operations. From the conclusions, this paper will propose recommendations on the following concepts: 1) A modular Naval Task Force, 2) A Task Force command and control organization comprised of six Operational Directors, and 3) Hands-on professional military education for joint maritime operations. Ultimately, this paper will reinforce how the tactical command and control system that is employed by the Navy directly impacts how all services plan and execute joint maritime operations.

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"CWC, DEPARTING": RETURN OF THE TASK FORCE COMMANDER

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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ABSTRACT

The Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) is a Navy command and control construct that was designed for the former "Carrier Battle Group" in, and specifically for, the Cold War. Though the Carrier Battle Group and the Cold War are both gone, the command and control doctrine, organization, and supporting systems designed for a very specific operational environment remain intact. This paper will analyze the objectives, organization, and process of the Composite Warfare Commander, Task Force Commander, and Maritime Operations Center, and how they will interact in today's joint operational environment. It will analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the CWC architecture, specifically in terms of interoperability, flexibility, and scalability. From this analysis, it will draw conclusions on the CWC's ability to effectively apply itself across the entire spectrum of joint operations. From the conclusions, this paper will propose recommendations on developing following concepts: 1) A modular Naval Task Force, 2) A Task Force command and control organization comprised of six Operational Directors, and 3) Hands-on professional military education for joint maritime operations. Ultimately, this paper will reinforce how the tactical command and control system that is employed by the Navy directly impacts how all services plan and execute joint maritime operations.

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War, the National, Defense, Military, and Maritime Strategies have continued to evolve to meet strategic objectives in the changing operational environment. The manner in which the U.S. organizes naval forces at the operational level in order to support strategic objectives has also changed. In order to support strategic objectives at the operational level, "the navy…has already begun changing its command and control structure to accommodate the full range of operations called for in the new strategy."[1] However, the tactical command and control (C2) doctrine and organization for the deployed fighting units have yet to adapt to the requirements detailed by current maritime strategy. The growing schism between operational and tactical C2 architecture limits the U.S. Navy's effectiveness in supporting strategic objectives.

The Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) organizational and doctrinal construct does not support the Navy's vision of a flexible, scalable, interoperable Naval Force capable of efficiently and effectively supporting the full spectrum of joint operations. Though the CWC is a construct designed for command and control at the tactical level, it directly shapes war-fighting mindset, frames capabilities, and influences decision making at the joint operational level.[2] The naval services are in the midst of updating operational service doctrine, specifically at the Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) level. As the Navy continues to develop and refine emergent maritime operational philosophy, doctrine, organization, and processes, it is appropriate to reexamine the legacy command and control construct underpinning every aspect of the conventional naval force. By closely examining how well CWC doctrine and organization supports combat operations at the joint operational level, the Navy can capitalize on this opportunity to modernize and align its service doctrine.

BACKGROUND

Strategic Context

The CWC doctrine and organization was developed during the Cold War for the specific purpose of defending High Value Units in the Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) or Amphibious Ready Group (ARG).[3] The deployment of the CVBG supported strategic objectives by deterring Soviet expansion, and providing defense-in-depth against Soviet attack. The metric to measure strategic and operational success was the ability to maintain persistent forward CVBG presence. In this light, the Carrier Battle Group's primary purpose, at every level of war, was simply to exist. This meant that it must be able to survive any type of attack, whether it came by sea, air, or land. This tactical objective, based solely on defense, would be the very foundation upon which the CWC doctrine and organization was built.

The maritime operational environment has clearly changed since the end of the Cold War. After the demise of the Former Soviet Union (FSU), there was no other peer competitor to contest the U.S. Navy's control of the sea. With maritime superiority assumed and "operations short of war" becoming the trend, it seemed logical to transition from a blue-water mindset to a littoral mindset.[4] Power projection overland became the guide-post for a series of new operational concepts that would shape how the Navy viewed its own role in joint warfare. This began a noted trend that "most of the Navy's attention is given to Strike Warfare."[5]

Operational Context

Through this slow philosophical metamorphosis, the Navy remained carrier-centric and "overly focused on the tactical employment of its combat forces in its doctrine and

practice."[6] The CVBG and ARG gave way to the Carrier Strike Group (CSG) and Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) as the primary combat units of the U.S. Navy. Capitalizing on the severe capability and technological mismatch, these were just scaled-down, cost-effective versions of what already existed. Through Operations DESERT STORM, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM, one could argue that it was unnecessary for the Navy to invest time and effort changing the operational and tactical command and control structure. As a supporting arm to an overland conflict, it is more efficient to integrate with the operational C2 resources already heavily invested in by the U.S. Air Force. However, as peer competitors re-emerge in the Pacific, the U.S. Navy is reinvigorating its focus on the operational level of war, and the ability to command and control joint forces in a contested maritime environment. Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), and Commander, SEVENTH Fleet (7th FLT) all demonstrate vested interest in improving the operational command and control capability in order to improve the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander's (JFMCC) ability to act as a supported commander in the execution of joint maritime operations.[7] Since the Navy "lacks operational level doctrine for war-at-sea," this "complicates subordinate tactical doctrinal publications."[8] Therefore operators and planners continue to wrestle with how to fully implement the new strategic and operational guidance using the old tactical organization and doctrine.[9]

ANALYSIS

In order to determine the best direction that the U.S. Navy should take regarding how it commands and controls forces at the operational and tactical level, there needs to be a

baseline understanding of the C2 structures that already exist. The following section will outline the objectives, organizational structure, and C2 process of the CWC, Task Force Commander (CTF), and Maritime Operations Center (MOC). This comparative overview will demonstrate how these organizations integrate with and build upon one another. Finally, the analysis will determine the degree to which these organizations support the current maritime strategy's vision for a flexible, tailor-able, and scalable naval force.[10]

CWC 101: An organization that supports the objective

The Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) of any navy fighting unit is ultimately responsible for the execution of that unit's mission.[11] The OTC is normally the Numbered Fleet Commander for a geographic region.[12] However, in order to facilitate decentralized execution and individual initiative, the responsibility of tactical command is normally delegated to unit commanders, such as the CSG or ESG Commander, whom directly report to the Numbered Fleet Commander.[13] While the primary responsibility of the OTC is to accomplish the mission of the forces assigned, it is the responsibility of the CWC to defend those forces.[14] With the goal of developing a decentralized C2 system, the OTC and CWC were specifically differentiated in order to gain efficiency in planning and executing defensive tasks. Depending on the complexity of the threat and operational environment, the OTC has the option of retaining the function of the CWC, or delegating it to a subordinate commander.[15]

The CWC is supported by five Principle Warfare Commanders (PWCs), five Functional Warfare Commanders (FWCs), and up to nine Coordinators (Figure 1).[16] The PWCs' are the command and control backbone of the CWC architecture, and are responsible for defending the High Value Unit(s) (HVU) from attack within their assigned domain of

warfare.[17] For example, the Surface Warfare Commander is responsible for defending against threats that operate on the surface of the ocean. In order to capitalize on the inherent subject matter expertise that this C2 structure produces, the OTC often delegates defensive tasks assigned to him by higher echelons of command to the appropriate PWC to plan and execute. For example, if a CSG Commander is assigned the responsibility of Regional Air Defense Commander (RADC) by the Joint Force Commander (JFC), he may delegate the planning and daily execution of this function to the Air Defense Commander (ADC) within the CWC.



Figure 1. Composite Warfare Commander Organization Chart (reprinted from U.S. Navy. *Composite Warfare Commander's Manual*, Naval Warfare Publication [NWP] 3-56, Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, August 2001, 2-1)

Functional Warfare Commanders will be stood up and stood down as dictated by the OTC. Though they will not be a primary C2 node, they may occasionally be assigned tactical control (TACON) of supporting assets in order to achieve their functional mission. While the PWCs are responsible primarily for defense, a quick glance at the FWC duties will demonstrate that they actually fulfill a range of tasks that support low to high end warfare.[18] Finally, the Warfare Coordinators support the PWCs and FWCs by ensuring that they have the resources required to execute their mission. With fixed resources, the PWCs and FWCs collaborate during the planning process in order to determine the apportionment and allocation of assets that will meet their objectives within an acceptable level of risk.

During the execution phase, PWC and FWC watch-standers all monitor a common tactical picture (CTP).[19] Based on this picture, the CWC can adjust and rebalance the allocation of resources in real-time by communicating with the PWCs and FWCs over a common C2 net (ex: SATCOM, UHF voice, chat), as seen in Figure 2.[20] This is critical since communications "bind all the elements of a force together into a cohesive whole."[21] Technological advances continue to increase both the speed and distance at which information can be shared, and improve the range and lethality of tactical weapons.[22] This reduces factor time and increases factor space and force that tactical commanders must consider when developing force defense doctrine. In littoral operations, the threat of asymmetric attack further exacerbates the problems with reduced factor time and maneuver space. All of these factors place a high demand on obtaining information superiority in order to generate an operational tempo (OPTEMPO) sufficient to counter this threat.[23] In order for the CWC to overcome a reduced factor of time, the doctrine is based on the execution of standardized pre-planned responses (PPRs).[24] PPRs eliminate the need for extensive

deliberation on decision making by tactical war-fighters. In theory, every threat scenario with the appropriate response has been pre-planned. This horizontal C2 structure provides the CWC information superiority within a three-dimensional battle space. Able to quickly respond to any threat, the CWC architecture provides effective and flexible area defense centered on the HVU. However, CSGs and ESGs are expected to do more than just defend themselves. Therein lay its primary limitation.



Figure 2. CWC Communications Nets (reprinted from U.S. Navy, *Composite Warfare Commander's Manual*, Naval Warfare Publication [NWP] 3-56. Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, August 2001, 2-6)

CTF 101: Tailoring the force for offense

In alignment with the Navy's vision for increased power projection capabilities predominant at the time, the August 2001 revision of CWC doctrine revisits the idea of the naval task force.[25] "Potential threats to freedom of the seas, and/or littoral operations may dictate the use of the task force."[26] Differing from the joint definition for task force, the

naval task force is "formed from two or more originally independent TGs, i.e. each with its own OTC and CWC."[27] The CWC was originally designed to support a single CSG or ESG conducting operations in geospatial isolation from other units. Without question, this alone poses many limitations upon the capabilities of maritime forces. The revision provides several different options to integrate the C2 structure of task groups operating in proximity to one another, as can be seen in Figures 3, 4, and 5. The mission objective and factor space between each TG will drive the manner in which they combine their C2 structure.



Figure 3. CTF Support Relationships Chart A (reprinted from U.S. Navy, *Composite Warfare Commander's Manual*, Naval Warfare Publication [NWP] 3-56, Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, August 2001, 15-4)

When the mission tasking is the same and the task groups are in proximity to one another, the operational commander may elect to combine TGs into a single TF (Figure 3). The senior OTC of the TGs will become Task Force Commander (CTF), and will have

tactical command (TACOM) of all units within the Task Force. He may then assign CWC functions to any unit within the new TF, but will normally retain STW responsibilities.[28] During complex missions, such as an amphibious assault, the task groups may elect to form supported/supporting relationships within a single TF without combining the command and control structure (Figure 4). The CTF retains CWC responsibility while ensuring that the supported TG has the resources they need to accomplish their objective. Finally, the operational commander may elect to assign supporting/supported relationships without integrating C2 structures and assigning the senior OTC as CTF (Figure 5).



Figure 4. CTF Support Relationships Chart B (reprinted from U.S. Navy, *Composite Warfare Commander's Manual*, Naval Warfare Publication [NWP] 3-56, Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, August 2001, 15-5)



Figure 5. CTF Support Relationships Chart C (reprinted from U.S. Navy, *Composite Warfare Commander's Manual*. Naval Warfare Publication [NWP] 3-56, Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, August 2001, 15-6)

Ultimately, the CTF structure is still built around the CWC architecture. Once the CTF option is selected, the OTC consolidates and distributes CWC tasks in a manner that effectively defends the new force structure. By consolidating human and material resources, less total combat power is required for planning and executing defense. This frees up more assets to plan for and execute other tasks. However, asserting that C2 is fully consolidated is also slightly overstated, since the CWC structures in all TGs remain fully intact. This means that there are multiple staffs and tactical operators, on different ships, executing similar functions. Because the "multi-mission capability of Navy ships and aircraft creates competition for asset assignment," the operational commander must ensure that tasking is

evenly distributed amongst units.[29] This places a higher requirement for centralized planning at the numbered fleet level in order to synchronize forces and concentrate effects. Although this doctrinal revision improves the operational commander's ability to tailor a naval force to meet operational mission requirements, it does not enhance that force's joint interoperability or joint C2 capacity.

MOC 101: Increasing capacity to lead Joint Maritime Operations

The primary objective of the operational commander is "translating strategic objectives into subordinate tasks/missions by specifying the 'what, when, where, who, and why,' and leaving the 'how' to the subordinates."[30] The current CWC/CTF organizations would certainly buckle under the weight of managing a large scale operation if it was tasked to lead joint forces in a maritime battle space as the supported commander. The new Maritime Operations Center (MOC) organization and doctrine, signed in October 2008, provides the Naval Component, Numbered Fleet, and Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) increased capacity and capability to command and control joint forces within the maritime domain.

The naval commander at the operational level tends to carry both operational and administrative responsibilities, resulting in dual chains of command.[31] Therefore, the standard "J-code" format is employed for managing fleet activity (administrative), while the Boards, Bureaus, Cells, Centers, Working Groups (B2C2WG) structure supports task oriented function**s** (operational). The operational and administrative functions combined with the command element comprise the MOC C2 organization (Figure 6).[32] It is important to emphasize that the personnel manning the administrative and operational staffs are one in the same. In other words, they too are *dual-hatting*. Generally, the MOC will be staffed with

a baseline number of personnel suitable for Phase 0 operations. However, the construct is designed to be flexible, tailor-able, and scalable in order to meet the full range of military operations and fleet management responsibilities.[33]



Figure 6. Maritime Operations Center Command Organization (reprinted from U.S. Navy, *Maritime Operations Center*, Naval Warfare Publication [NWP] 3-32, Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, October 2008, 7-17)

This C2 organization and process is aligned with joint doctrine. As with other Joint Operations Centers (JOC), the daily "Battle Rhythm" is the method in which the maritime operational staff executes command and control of joint maritime forces. The MOC will seek to integrate and synchronize the operational functions so the operational commander can effectively direct joint maritime forces through the ROMO.[34] Therefore, the battle rhythm may look similar to the AOC's 72-hour Air Tasking Order (ATO) Cycle, in that it has "five sets of products being worked at any one time: yesterday's plan, today's plan, tomorrow's

plan, the next day's plan, and the next phase."[35] The Navy has sufficiently established the scope, organization, and objective of the MOC. The next logical step would be to determine how to integrate an operational C2 construct that supports the current maritime strategy with a "pre-9/11" tactical C2 construct developed for a different operational environment.



Figure 7. Notional Task Organization. NWP 3-32 provides a generic recommendation on how a Naval Component can organize Task Forces. (reprinted from U.S. Navy, *Maritime Operations Center*, Naval Warfare Publication [NWP] 3-32, Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, October 2008, 4-16)

One proposed method for integrating the new MOC structure into the existing CTF/CWC structure is to develop a new, standardized Task Force structure that organizes the task units into task forces based on function, capability, geography, or a combination thereof (Figure 7).[36] In some ways, it will resemble the structure that currently exists in SEVENTH FLEET, but is not standardized.[37] In an example of the proposed model, CTF 770 (CSG) brings a power projection capability, while CTF 772 (ESG) brings the amphibious assault

capability. CTF 773 will be comprised of various logistics platforms, and CTF 774 will be comprised only of submarines.[38] In some ways, this concept provides the JFMCC a menu naval force. The JFMCC can now choose and assign the Task Forces that have the capabilities required for each operation. Depending on the mission, each Task Force would be assigned a supported/supporting relationship role. Often, each Task Force Commander will be both supported and supporting across a multitude of tasks, across numerous lines of operation.

CONCLUSIONS

Judging by this progression of C2 structural improvements, it seems that the Navy has almost completely answered the call in creating a flexible, tailor-able, scalable force capable of executing tasks across the full range of military operations. However, this is only veneer. The CTF structure prescribed in the *NWP 3-32: MOC* expands upon the CTF structure as it existed in the *NWP 3-56A: CWC Manual*. The CTF structure in the *NWP 3-56A* was an addendum to the original CWC structure. In other words, the bedrock of all Naval C2 doctrine is still the CWC. And looking ahead to future CTF concepts in the early stages of development, the CWC continues to exude its overwhelming influence upon the Navy at both the operational and tactical level.[39] With this in mind, the following conclusions will summarize the impact that the CWC and CTF have on joint maritime operations.

Net Assessment: CWC and CTF

Without question, the CWC is well suited to area defense due to its ability to employ flexible defensive fires. The objective is singular, and the command organization that supports it is unambiguous. This enables decentralized execution. The horizontal C2

structure allows the PWCs to collaborate and quickly fuse pieces of information from multiple sources into a single, coherent picture. The result of this collaboration and intelligence fusion is a Composite Warfare Commander who can expeditiously identify a threat in a multi-dimensional environment, assess which resources are available to respond, and assign the most effective weapon to prosecute that threat. When coupled with the CTF force structure, this defensive capability becomes scalable while somewhat maintaining its simplicity. By consolidating defensive resources, the CWC provides the OTC more resources to use for a broader range of tasks, from power projection to Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA).[40] This tends to bring the FWCs, who normally operate at the lower range of warfare, to the forefront of operations.

With its lopsided emphasis on defense, the monolithic CWC architecture tends to tie multi-mission naval platforms to the mission of the CWC, thus limiting the OTC's ability to affect operational maneuver and fires. Whether it is overland strike, area defense, or information warfare, a unit commander may be assigned responsibility for executing one mission while simultaneously providing support to another mission. The doctrine of pre-planned responses fosters a passive culture in its officer corps. The tactical watch standers are trained to wait for a pre-identified situation to develop, and then react with a prescribed solution. Though the CSG and ESG have an extremely potent arsenal of tools to conduct operational fires and maneuver, these factors tend to limit full freedom in their employment. Logistics, the daily lifeblood of maritime operations, resides on the second tier of C2 as a FWC. Even though unity of command exists, these factors dilute unity of effort concerning tasks other than defense.

The CWC-centric CTF construct proposed in the NWP 3-56A provides a means to consolidate resources, defend more with less, and project naval power ashore. However, it does not add any additional capabilities in terms of low end warfare. Depending on the operational environment, each CTF in the notional model proposed in NWP 3-32 could become overly dependent upon the support of another CTF's resources. Though supported/supporting relationships may be established, the mission capability-centric manner in which the TFs are organized will only leave the CTFs competing for resources that do not belong to them. This will preclude CTFs from operating autonomously, and places a larger burden on the JFMCC staff to arbitrate, or "manage a social system…dealing with conflicting ends at any and all levels."[41] This effectively reduces the ability of the subordinate to demonstrate autonomous initiative, and diminishes the Navy's long-standing traditions surrounding command at sea. Finally, neither provides any additional joint capacity to the deployed commander.

Implications to Joint Maritime Operations

CWC doctrine is not tailor-able to joint operational mission requirements. It creates a Naval Force that is overly specialized in mission tasking. Standardized procedures like PPRs can be very effective for defense and decentralized execution. However, contrary to what the CWC manual states, a standard procedure for every possible tactical situation simply cannot be conceived nor trained to.[42] PPR culture does not train war fighters to think abstractly, nor does it foster the problem solving skills required to meet the full range of operations. We must remember that "sea power with its concurrent military and geo-economic focus supports national security goals through operations that do not necessarily include either adversaries or combat."[43]

The CWC organization does not provide a naval force that is truly flexible across operational functions. Serving as a PWC, and to a lesser extent FWC, is a common operational career milestone before selecting for Flag Officer. Most CWC positions are specifically tied to a certain platform background, for example the ADC will almost always be the senior AEGIS Cruiser captain.[44] Since every officer, no matter what pay-grade, is first evaluated on how well he or she executes their primary responsibility, the roots of the Navy's platforms-centric view to problem solving can be seen in its C2 structure. From this, the Navy develops and reinforces deep-rooted stovepipes that are recurrent in naval systems, doctrine, and officer development.

The CWC architecture does not have the capacity to support additional operational functions beyond the ones that it is already designed to support. Certainly, the CWC quite capably supports the operational commander in C2 and protection. To a lesser extent it supports intelligence and logistics, but it is very limited in joint capacity. The operational functions that the CWC does not support are fires and movement/maneuver. The CWC is effective at supporting the higher end of the ROMO such as strikes, sanctions, shows of force, freedom of navigation, and protection of shipping. Operations at the lower end, such as counter-insurgency, non-combatant evacuation operations, and foreign humanitarian assistance, will stretch the CWC's capacity to effectively command and control forces. The analysis points to numerous C2 seams between the operational and tactical level. Lack of joint interoperability and C2 capacity within the naval maneuver force will limit the JFMCC's ability to lead joint maritime operations across the ROMO.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to continue to be relevant in today's operational environment, the command and control doctrine, organization, and system that guides the Fleet needs to be more tailorable, scalable, and responsive to the range of operations expected in the modern national security environment. Six operational functions support this overarching objective – C2, Fires, Movement and Maneuver, Intelligence, Logistics, and Protection.[45] "These functional areas provide the basis from which tactical units derive their freedom of action to engage in physical combat. These functions are mutually supporting."[46] With this in mind, the following three recommendations are provided as a stimulus for thought in how this might be achieved.

In coordination with the U.S. Marine Corps, develop a standard template for a modular Naval Task Force that can be tailored to mission requirements and be completely self-sustaining in the modern operational environment. This will support the current Navy vision of a "regionally concentrated forward deployed task force" with "mission tailored force packages."[47] The massive organizational transformation that the Army and Marine Corps have undergone in order to become more responsive to national security requirements serves as a template. The focus on the Brigade Combat Team and the Marine Expeditionary Brigade serving as the primary combat unit demonstrates this shift to modularity.[48] The Navy's baseline fighting unit must be completely self-sustaining in terms of their ability to cover all six of the operational functions. Each Task Force will have a command element, which would most appropriately be a big deck carrier due to its ability to provide scalable, on scene command and control. As can be seen in Figure 8, a basic combination of surface combatants, submarines, air components, and ground forces will always be attached to this

task force. Detailed capabilities can be added or removed as needed. This model differs from the Task Force Concepts that are currently being considered for refinement.[49] Instead of a menu Navy at the Numbered Fleet level, it will be at the CTF level. In other words, the CTF will be the baseline unit upon which the maneuver force is built. The scale of each module supporting the CTF will be respectively smaller. Scalability will be met with the ability to combine two or more Task Forces with the addition of a deployed command element for the JFMCC or Numbered Fleet Commander.



Figure 8. Proposed Task Organization. Recommendation provided by author for organizing forces at the Task Force level.

Create a joint interoperable C2 organization that is scalable with the newly developed modular force. The Task Force command element will be a Rear Admiral supported by six Operational Directors for C2, Fires, Intel, Logistics, Movement and Maneuver, and Protection as seen in Figure 9. Since this analysis has demonstrated that the CWC is highly effective at force defense, this process will remain as the protection component amongst the

other operational functions. To facilitate a smooth transition to a new C2 paradigm, all of the major commands at sea would transition into their new roles as one of the directors. This will minimize ripples in career tracks in the short-term. Similar in philosophy to the NWP 3-56A, collocate all of the directors on the command ship. The CTF can now ensure both unity of command and effort in the balancing of all the prescribed operational tasks.[50] These directors are now the first echelon of the CTF administrative and operational staff. They will manage a complement of staff officers that can augmented with joint LNOs as required by operational tasking. A forward deployed tactical C2 staff that is planning for and executing all of the operational functions will enable the CTF greater freedom to employ maritime maneuver forces in the manner that best suits the mission.

Commander, Naval Task Force O-7/O-8

Director	CWC / MAJ COM	Rank	Warfare Specialty
C2	Chief of Staff	O-6	ANY
Fires	Air Wing Commander	O-6	Aviation
Maneuver	Destroyer Squadron Commander	O-6	Surface
Protection	CWC	O-6	ANY
Intelligence	IWC	O-6	ANY
Sustainment	AREC	O-6	ANY

Figure 9. Proposed Task Force Staff Organization

In order to successfully transition to this new paradigm, the Navy must expand the professional military education (PME) continuum to include a greater emphasis on joint operations at sea. The typical platform-centric career progression for most officers within the CWC environment certainly shapes their view of how to conduct military operations. Educating Navy leadership in joint interoperability through operational experience and practice, rather than just academics and shore duty assignments, will create a deeper and more practical understanding of joint maritime operations. One possible way to achieve this would be to rotate the former CWC watch-standers and officer corps through the watch organizations managed by the CTF Directors. This will provide them command and control experience across various war-fighting dimensions. With LNOs on staff in the command element, this will foster joint interoperability within the maritime domain and provide valuable hands-on operational experience that will be useful for the rest of that officer's career. An interoperable naval officer begets an interoperable naval force. Developing joint operational war-fighters, early and often, will satisfy the future demands for more jointly-trained leadership. "From the beginning, there should be a broader education…inculcating into the youngsters a general understanding of the uses of all weapons and services – Halsey."[51]

FINAL REMARKS

The current and projected maritime operational environment "requires a new way of thinking – about empowering individual commanders and the net effects of dispersed operations."[52] The changes recommended above will support the Navy's over-arching vision for a modern naval combat force and directly improve the following operational capabilities

of the JFMCC. The commander of a modular naval task force will have all of the tools and resources required for a variety of tasks with greater ability to maneuver those forces. By serving in a modular naval force with a command and control system comprised of cells supporting the six operational functions, Navy Officers will develop nimble thought patterns early in their career that will provide them the necessary experience to meet the numerous challenges in today's and tomorrow's joint maritime operational environment.

Inevitably, there will be challenges if the Navy endeavors to execute wholesale reform of this magnitude, and thereby warrants continued research. First, Navy leadership will have to adjust the training track within the Fleet Response Plan. Second, current C2 systems supporting each Navy ship were built with the CWC architecture in mind. Navy Systems Command will have to determine the lead agent to transform the C2 systems that support a modern architecture. Also, Navy Personnel Command will have to conduct an analysis on a new officer career path in order properly sequence officers through modern individual and staff training requirements. Finally, as Admiral Stavridis said when commenting on a similar topic, "The reform of the Navy's officer corps…will be effective only if the new vision is translated into positive results in promotion and selection boards."[53]

The CWC seems to draw continuous criticism and praise depending on the vantage point from which the issue is viewed. One thing is certain. It continues to adapt to both the modern operational environment and the joint command and control architecture that are now enveloping it. So in this light, it seems almost a foregone conclusion that the CWC must continue to evolve. Should the Navy continue to bend and warp the CWC architecture until it is aligned with the emerging Task Force and Maritime Operation Center models? Or, should there be an entirely new force paradigm instilled into each naval officer? Perhaps,

this vision of a *future* naval force actually takes us *back* to a time when Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher, CTF 38, was scouring the South Pacific, fighting the enemy with every tool – sea, land, and air – he had at his disposal. Autonomous, versatile, and lethal – what is new is old, and what is old is new. The Task Force Commander has returned. It is time to give him the force structure he needs to win.

END NOTES

[1] Robert C. Rubel, "The Navy's Changing Force Paradigm," *Naval War College Review* 62, no. 2, (Spring 2009): 24.
[2] U.S. Navy, *Maritime Operations Center*, Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-32, (Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, October 2008), Appendix A.
[3] U.S. Navy, *Composite Warfare Commander Manual*, Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-56A, (Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, August 2001), 1-1.
[4] Milan Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare* (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College 20 September 2007), 122.
[5] Milan Vego, "Obsessed with Tactics," *Armed Forces Journal*, May 2008, 30. Also, "From the Sea" and "Forward…From the Sea" identified the ends, while "Net-Centric Warfare" and "Sea Power 21" identified the ways and means to which the U.S. Navy would organize, train and equip itself to meet the new national security environment.
[6] Vego, "Obsessed with Tactics," 30.
[7] CDR Dave Polatty, (U.S. Naval War College JFMCC Planner Course, Newport, RI), interview by author, 29 April 2009.
[8] Vego, "Obsessed with Tactics," 30.
[9] CDR Mark Colombo, "CVW FIVE Lesson Learned for Exercise TERMINAL FURY '08 (U)" March 2008 (Secret), Information extracted is unclassified.
[10] U.S. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power*, (Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, October 2007), 8, 10, 15. Also, NWP 3-32, *Maritime Operations Center*, 7-1.
[11] NWP 3-56A, *Composite Warfare Commander Manual*, 2-1. Tactical Command (TACOM): The authority delegated to a commander for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority. This term is used primarily in maritime operations. It is narrower in scope than operational command but includes the authority to delegate or retain tactical control, p 32.
[12] NWP 3-56A, *Composite Warfare Commander Manual*, 2-6. Figure 2-2.
[13] NWP 3-56A, *Composite Warfare Commander Manual*, 2-6.
[14] NWP 3-56A, *Composite Warfare Commander Manual*, 2-3.
[15] NWP 3-56A, *Composite Warfare Commander Manual*, 2-3.
[16] NWP 3-56A, *Composite Warfare Commander Manual*, 2-4. Figure 2-1.
[17] High Value Unit (HVU): Also can be referred to Mission Essential Units (MEU). The OTC may designate naval platforms that are absolutely essential to the accomplishment of the mission, or are of such high value, that damage or loss to those units could mean tactical, operational or strategic defeat.
[18] NWP 3-56A, *Composite Warfare Commander Manual*, 2-4. Figure 2-1.
[19] The CTP is based on Global Command and Control System-Maritime (GCCS-M) and other C4ISR inputs.
[20] NWP 3-56A, *Composite Warfare Commander Manual*, 14-5. Figure 14-1.
[21] Vego, *Joint Operations*, 597.
[22] Vego, *Joint Operations*, 598.
[23] Vego, *Joint Operations*, 598.
[24] NWP 3-56A, *Composite Warfare Commander Manual*, 2-7.
[25] NWP 3-56A, *Composite Warfare Commander Manual*, 15-1.
[26] NWP 3-56A, *Composite Warfare Commander Manual*, 15-1.
[27] NWP 3-56A, *Composite Warfare Commander Manual*, 15-1.
[28] NWP 3-56A, *Composite Warfare Commander Manual*, 15-2.
[29] U.S. Navy, *Maritime Operations Center*, Naval Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-32.1, (Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, October 2008), 4-12.
[30] NWP 3-32, *Maritime Operations Center*, 1-6.
[31] NWP 3-32, *Maritime Operations Center*, 3-11.
[32] NWP 3-32, *Maritime Operations Center*, 7-17, Figure 7-6.
[33] NWP 3-32, *Maritime Operations Center*, 7-1 – 7-17.
[34] NWP 3-32, *Maritime Operations Center*, 7-18.
[35] NWP 3-32, *Maritime Operations Center*, 7-24.
[36] NWP 3-32, *Maritime Operations Center*, 4-16, Figure 4-9.
[37] US PACFLT SIPR Homepage (accessed 22 April 2009).

[38] U.S. Naval War College, "JFMCC Planner Course," PowerPoint, April 2009.
[39] Polatty, David, interview.
[40] NWP 3-56A, *Composite Warfare Commander Manual*, 15-1.
[41] Swain, Richard "Commander's Business: Learning to Practice Operational Design," *Naval War College Review* 62, no. 2, (Spring 2009), 62.
[42] NWP 3-56A, *Composite Warfare Commander Manual*, 2-8.
[43] NWP 3-32, *Maritime Operations Center*, 2-7.
[44] NWP 3-56A, *Composite Warfare Commander Manual*, 4-2.
[45] NWP 3-32, *Maritime Operations Center*, 1-6, 5-9.
[46] NWP 3-32, *Maritime Operations Center*, 6-1.
[47] U.S. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power*, 15, 18.
[48] U.S. Marine Corps, "Roles and Missions, Organization, Capabilities, Employment Considerations, Concepts, Programs and Current Issues," Service Capabilities PowerPoint, 15 March 2008.
[49] Murray, James, (U.S. Naval War College Maritime Staff Operator Course, Newport, RI), interview by author, 2 April 2009.
[50] NWP 3-56A, *Composite Warfare Commander Manual*, 4-2.
[51] James Staviridis and Mark Hagerott, "The Heart of an Officer," *Naval War College Review* 62, no. 2, (Spring 2009), 31.
[52] U.S. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power*, 18.
[53] Stavridis and Hagerott, "The Heart of an Officer," 40.

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